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Abstract 
 
This paper offers, evidence on the effect of ECB’s conventional and unconventional 
monetary policy on economic expectations in Euro-area countries during the US and 
EU crisis. We employ a range of research methodologies in a sample of nine 
Eurozone countries and combine expectations/sentiment indicators with a set of 
macroeconomic and financial variables. We find that ECB’s conventional monetary 
policy (and Fed’s monetary policy stance) has a positive and significant effect on 
economic expectations for Core Eurozone countries and a weak effect on Peripheral 
Eurozone countries. ECB’s unconventional policy measures, however, have a 
negative effect on Core countries’ economic expectations. This result is robust to 
different methodologies (PVAR, QVAR, FAVAR) and different datasets. Overall, our 
findings highlight the importance of monetary policy in the determination of 
economic expectations.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The main aim of the European Central Bank (ECB) is to maintain price stability; in 
addition it contributes to the stability of the financial system within the Euro-area by 
monitoring developments in the banking and financial sectors. The main instrument of 
monetary policy by central banks is their influence over money market interest rates, 
which affect expectations of future official interest rates, the actions of economic 
agents, and ultimately the evolution of output and prices. As the ECB itself 
acknowledges, the expectations transmission channel of monetary policy has gained 
importance during the recent decades. For instance, a high degree of central bank 
credibility can have a strong impact on price developments by guiding economic 
agents’ expectations, and thus “….understanding the transmission mechanism is 
crucial for monetary policy” (p.61, The Monetary Policy of the ECB, 2011; 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu).  
 
Furthermore, as Lutz (2015) argues, there is a necessity to understand the relationship 
between investor sentiment and monetary policy since central banks are 
contemplating the use of monetary policy tools in order to tackle the volatility 
associated with asset bubbles and financial crises. Indeed, during the recent financial 
crises in the US and the EU, official policy rates approached the zero lower bound and, 
as a result, central banks in developed economies resorted to unconventional 
monetary policy mechanisms in order to tackle financial market volatility and 
preserve financial stability (see, Gambacorta et al., 2014; Fawley and Neely, 2013).  
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This paper examines the effect of ECB’s unconventional and conventional monetary 
policy during the EU crisis on economic expectations.
1
 For monetary policy to 
achieve the target of price stability it has to affect expectations, in other words, affect 
consumer and economic confidence. We ask whether ECB’s monetary policy during 
the recent crises does that, since previous studies on unconventional policies focus on 
the Fed and US data. Lutz (2015), for example, studies the effect of Fed’s 
conventional and unconventional monetary policy on investor sentiment and finds that 
during conventional policies a surprise drop in the fed funds rate has a positive impact 
on investor sentiment that lasts several months; unconventional monetary policy 
shocks have a similar impact on economic sentiment. Also, Gambacorta et al. (2014) 
examine the macroeconomic effects of unconventional monetary policy and find a 
positive effect on economic activity following exogenous increases in central bank 
balance sheets. We also examine the effect of the Fed’s monetary policy stance on 
economic expectations in the Euro-area and sentiment spill-overs from the US to the 
Euro-area.  
 
The paper contributes to the relevant literature on the effects of monetary policy. For 
example, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) find that the Fed’s monetary shocks have a 
significant impact on expected excess equity returns and suggest that investors may 
overreact, or be very sensitive, to monetary shocks. This result is consistent with 
Kurov (2010), who finds that the Fed’s monetary policy decisions have a significant 
effect on US investor sentiment, or with Bekaert et al. (2013) who document a 
relationship between investor risk aversion and monetary policy. Neuenkirch (2013) 
                                                        
1
 Many previous studies document the effect of economic agent expectations on economic activity, 
economic and investment behavior, and asset prices (see, among others, Benhabib et al., 2016; Chen,  
2011; Hwang, 2011; Bachmann and Sims, 2012; Baker and Wurgler, 2007; Brown and Cliff, 2004; 
Fisher and Statman, 2003; Neal and Wheatley, 1998). 
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focuses on the effect of central bank communication on monetary policy transmission 
and finds that it has a similar influence on expectations about inflation as that of 
actual target rate changes. Neuenkirch (2013) argues that communication has become 
an important tool for central bankers, since regular information releases about 
monetary policy can affect rate expectations before actual rate changes.  
 
For the empirical analysis, we use a range of methodologies where we combine 
sentiment indicators with a set of monetary, macroeconomic and financial variables. 
For the investigation of the conventional monetary policy effect on investor’s 
expectations, a panel VAR setting is employed, which allows us to combine the 
traditional VAR modelling with a panel-data approach that allows for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity (see, Love and Zicchino, 2006). In order to study the effects 
of ECB’s unconventional monetary stance we use a Qual VAR model (Dueker, 2005), 
which combines the binary information of the unconventional monetary 
announcements with an otherwise standard VAR; i.e. it allows the use of 
unconventional policy announcements as an endogenous factor of the system. In other 
words, the Qual VAR model allows us to derive the latent propensity of ECB’s 
unconventional monetary. In order to robust the results concerning the unconventional 
monetary policy effects, we also employ a Factor-Augmented VAR (FAVAR) model 
(Bernanke et al., 2005), that combines the standard VAR analysis with factor analysis 
and utilizes a large number of informative macroeconomic and financial time series 
used by investors and policymakers. As an indicator for unconventional monetary 
policy in the FAVAR model we use the latent propensity of ECB’s unconventional 
monetary stance produced by the Qual VAR model. It is the first paper that uses the 
latent propensity for ECB’s unconventional monetary stance deriving from a Qual 
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VAR model (Dueker, 2005) as a monetary instrument, combining this way, the Qual 
VAR and FAVAR methodologies. Our sample consists of nine Eurozone countries 
that we group in two sub-samples denoted for simplicity as the “Core” countries and 
the “Peripheral” countries. We measure the expectations of economic agents in the 
Euro-area with the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), which is a composite index 
with five sectoral confidence indicators as constituents, compiled by the European 
Commission.  
 
We find that ECB’s conventional monetary policy (and Fed’s monetary policy stance) 
during the EU crisis has a positive and significant effect on economic expectations for 
Core Eurozone countries and a weak effect on Peripheral countries. Moreover, the 
Main Refinancing Operations rate appears to be the single most important net sender 
of shocks to the Peripheral countries, while for the Core countries it is the second 
most important net receiver. Our results, however, indicate that the effect of ECB’s 
unconventional measures on expectations was less efficient compared to the effect of 
conventional measures. More specifically, in contrast to previous results on the Fed 
unconventional policy, ECB’s unconventional measures had a negative effect to the 
expectation variation in most Core countries. 
 
Our findings of a positive effect of conventional policy on sentiment are consistent 
with previous findings, however, the finding of a negative effect of unconventional 
policy on sentiment is not. Lutz (2015) finds that Fed’s unconventional monetary 
policy shocks have a similar impact on economic sentiment as conventional policies 
(see also, Fratzscher et al., 2013, 2014). An explanation for the differences in the 
results may be the different nature of unconventional policies the two central banks 
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followed after 2010. For example, one should make the distinction between the 
subprime crisis in the US (2007-2009) during which the reaction of the Fed and the 
ECB was similar, and the EU crisis that erupted in 2010 where there have been 
important differences in the policies employed. More specifically, as Gros et al. 
(2012) point out, while the Fed (and the Bank of England) responded with QE 
policies signaling a strong will to undertake credit risk, the ECB responded with an 
approach that could be described as ‘credit easing’; that is, the massive response to 
the crisis with the Long Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) and the Securities 
Markets Programme (SMP) was also targeted at minimizing ECB’s own risk (p. 5). It 
must also be noted that while at the time the focus in the US was on the economic 
cycle and economic recovery, in the Euro area increased uncertainty about a Greek 
default, the effective isolation from the inter-bank market of some Peripheral country 
banking systems, and the restoration the monetary policy transmission mechanism, 
was the priority (for a detailed discussion see Gros et al., 2012).  
 
These results have implications for policy makers. For instance, a prolonged period of 
low interest rates reduces the efficiency of the main policy instrument used by central 
banks, which may have to rely increasingly to non-standard measures to deal with 
future financial crises. Of particular interest to policy makers could be the finding that 
the formation of economic expectations following a monetary policy shock is not 
uniform among Eurozone countries: expectations seem to be more affected in Core 
rather than Peripheral Eurozone countries. Understanding these effects can help 
design more efficient policy tools. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
section 2 briefly reviews unconventional monetary policy actions, section 3 presents 
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the data and the testing methodologies, section 4 presents the results, whilst section 5 
concludes the paper.  
 
2.  A Brief Review of Unconventional Monetary Policies  
 
The significance and the strength of the subprime crisis in the US (2007-2008) and the 
financial crisis in the EU (2010-2013) led to unchartered territory for major central 
banks, which responded by adopting non-standard monetary policy actions (see, for a 
review, Fawley and Neely, 2013). Initially, the ECB, together with other central banks 
from developed economies, responded by reducing its key interest rates and as a result 
the main refinancing rate was reduced to 1% (a decrease of 325 bp between October 
2008 and May 2009). In addition to rate cuts, the ECB implemented the Enhanced 
Credit Support (ECS) that mainly consisted of an extension of the maturity of 
liquidity provision in Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), Supplementary 
Long Term Refinancing Operations (SLTROs), and “Very” Long Term Refinancing 
Operations (VLTROs); a fixed rate full allotment tender procedure where, in contrast 
to standard procedures, financial institutions in the euro-area had unlimited access to 
central bank liquidity at the main refinancing rate; currency swap agreements that 
allowed the provision of liquidity in foreign currencies during the crisis; collateral 
requirements that involved an extension of the eligible collateral accepted in 
refinancing operations; a covered bond purchase programme.
2
  
 
                                                        
2
 For instance, in March 2008 the ECB introduced 6-month SLTROs, in May 2009 the ECB announced 
for the first time 12-month SLTROs (in the largest 12-month auction the ECB allotted around 442 
billion euro), in December 2011 the ECB announced two “very” long term refinancing operations 
(VLTROs) with a 3-year maturity. Towards the end of 2009 the ECB initiated the phase-out of many 
elements of this policy. 
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By March 2010 when the EU crisis started to unfold, however, the ECB, in an attempt 
to inject liquidity and restore the monetary policy transmission mechanism announced 
the Securities Markets Programme (SMP)
3
, i.e. direct purchases of government bonds 
(Greek, Portuguese and Irish) in secondary markets (often on a daily basis without a 
predetermined public target in terms of price or quantity, depending on market 
conditions). Within SMP all purchases were fully neutralized through liquidity-
absorbing operations. In August 2011, the ECB extended the SMP to Italian and 
Spanish Government bonds; by early 2012, the ECB held around 220 billion euro of 
sovereign bonds. The SMP became “dormant” in early 2012 and was officially 
deactivated in September 2012. In September 2012, in the midst of fears of a euro 
area break-up, the ECB announced the introduction of a new policy instrument, the 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs). The OMTs consist of purchases of 
government bonds with a maturity of up to three years, issued by countries under a 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) macroeconomic adjustment programme or a 
precautionary programme (Enhanced Conditions Credit Line).  
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the Fed responded to the subprime crisis with 
Quantitative Easing (QE): before the crisis the Fed held between $700 billion and 
$800 billion of Treasury notes on its balance sheet; by late November 2008 it started 
buying $600 billion in mortgage-backed securities (QE1), by March 2009 it held 
$1.75 trillion of bank debt, mortgage-backed securities, and Treasury notes, and by 
June 2010 it held $2.1 trillion. In November 2010, the Fed announced a second round 
of Quantitative Easing (QE2), buying $600 billion of Treasury securities by the end of 
                                                        
3
 Note that Falagiarda et al. (2015), in a study on non-euro area EU countries, argue that, for the SMP 
announcements, portfolio rebalancing and signalling channels were important in policy transmission, 
while for the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) the confidence transmission channel reduced 
redenomination risk. 
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the second quarter of 2011. A third round of Quantitative Easing (QE3) was 
announced on 13 September 2012, i.e. a $40 billion per month open-ended bond 
purchasing program. 
 
3. Data and Testing Methodology  
 
For the empirical analysis we employ monthly data on sentiment indicators, 
macroeconomic aggregates, and financial variables (see, among others, Lutz, 2015), 
for the period between May 2007 and October 2012. All data are obtained from 
EIKON and Bloomberg. More specifically, our sample consists of nine Eurozone 
countries that we group in two sub-samples denoted for simplicity as the “Core” 
countries (Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium and Austria) and the “Peripheral” 
countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece). For these countries we collect data on 
Industrial Production (IP), Stock Returns (Stock_Ret, main equity indexes), 
Unemployment (Unemploym), Consumer Prices (HICP), and Trade Balance 
(Tradebal). To measure ECB’s conventional monetary policy we employ the Main 
Operations Refinancing rate (MROr) and to measure Fed’s monetary policy stance we 
employ the shadow Fed funds rate (Wu and Xia, 2016).
4
  
 
As a proxy for Economic expectations/sentiment in the Eurozone countries (US) we 
employ monthly observations on the ESI (Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, 
MCSI). The ESI is compiled within the Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business 
and Consumer Surveys and is a composite indicator made up of five sectoral 
confidence indicators (industrial, services, consumption, construction, retail trade) 
                                                        
4
 Note that when the fed funds rate is above its zero lower bound the fed funds rate is equal to the 
shadow funds rate. 
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with different weights. Previous empirical work shows that sentiment indexes contain 
information that is not already reflected in other macroeconomic variables (see, 
among others, Carroll at al., 1994; Acemoglu and Scott, 1994; Matsusaka and 
Sbordone, 1995; Bachmann and Sims, 2012; Barsky and Sims, 2012). The MCSI is a 
consumer confidence indicator published by the University of Michigan and is 
typically employed in empirical studies to measure expectations and consumer 
optimism and pessimism, or as a predictor of asset returns (see, among others, Barsky 
and Sims, 2012; Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006; Fisher and Statman, 2003). For the 
empirical analysis we use the indexes in first differences.  
 
3.1. The Impact of Conventional Monetary Policy: A PVAR approach  
 
For the empirical analysis we employ a panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) model 
with monthly data on sentiment indicators, macroeconomic aggregates and financial 
variables (see, among others, Lutz, 2015). In this setting, all variables in the system 
are treated as endogenous, while allowing for unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
Thus, we are able to combine the traditional VAR model with a panel-data approach 
based on the PVAR routine written by I. Love (Love and Zicchino, 2006). We first 
specify a first-order seven-variable VAR model:  
          𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑜 + 𝛾1𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑢𝑡                                        (1) 
where ~ i.i.d. (0,Σ) and  expresses the time invariant fixed effects.   
 
In (1), the PVAR shown, does not allow for dynamic interdependencies and cross 
sectional heterogeneities, since 𝛾𝑜 and 𝛾1are the same across all units, or for static 
interdependencies since we assume that 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑗𝑡) = 0, for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 (see Love and 
TtNi ,...1,....,1 
tu if
11 
 
Zicchino, 2006; Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013; Grossmann et al., 2014). The evidence 
presented from this analysis is mostly based on the results from the impulse-response 
functions and the variance decompositions. Furthermore, we use a Cholesky 
decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of residuals, since the actual 
variance-covariance matrix of the errors is highly unlikely to be diagonal. In this case, 
it becomes difficult to isolate shocks to one of the VAR errors, i.e. we have to 
decompose the residuals in a way that they become orthogonal. Here, to identify 
monetary policy shocks, we follow Christiano et al. (1999) recursive ordering. We use 
a Cholesky decomposition based on the following ordering of variables for the model: 
IP, HICP, MROr, Stock_Ret, Unemploym, Tradebal, ESI. We considered alternative 
orderings, but the change in ordering does not affect our analysis and conclusions. We 
allow for individual heterogeneity in levels by introducing fixed effects, however, 
simple-mean differencing will provide biased estimators, as fixed effects are 
correlated with the regressors due to lags of the dependent variables. In order to avoid 
that, we follow Love and Zicchino (2006) and introduce the forward mean-
differencing procedure of Helmert transformation. Since, dependent and lagged 
variables remain orthogonal we can estimate the coefficients by using system GMM. 
To analyze the impulse response functions we calculate the standard errors of the 
impulse-response functions and generate confidence intervals using Monte Carlo 
simulations with 200 replications. Therefore, whenever the zero line lies outside the 
confidence bands there is evidence of a statistically significant response to the shock 
inflicted.  
 
We also apply the methodology of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012) in order to 
measure the intensity of the spillover effects from shocks to each one of the variables. 
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This methodology relies on Generalized Impulse Response Functions (Pesaran and 
Shin, 1998), which permits the calculation of a spillover matrix. The rows of this 
matrix reveal the individual impact, over a number of periods, of a shock to one 
variable (impulse variable) on each one of the other variables (response variables) in 
the system as well as the total sum of the impacts on all the variables (sum out). 
Accordingly, the columns of the matrix show the impact received of an individual 
variable from shocks on each one of the other variables as well as the total received 
impact (total in). The matrix facilitates the identification of the variables, which are 
responsible for the instability caused in the system.  
 
3.2. The Impact of Unconventional Monetary Policy: A Qual VAR approach  
 
In order to capture the effect of unconventional policy measures we first construct a 
binary variable which takes the value of one in the month of a monetary policy 
announcement and zero otherwise. One important issue is that these announcements 
have to be sufficiently unexpected and significant enough. We identify these 
announcements by focusing only on ECB announcements related to unconventional 
policy measures (SLTROs, SMP, OMT) that were covered in the front page of the 
Financial Times on the following day (see for details, Fratzscher et al., 2014; 
Fratzscher et al., 2013). This alleviates the concern that announcements were not 
important or were simply expected. The dates are presented in the Appendix A. Since 
this is a binary variable, we employ as a testing methodology a Qual VAR (see, 
Dueker, 2005), which is based on the single-equation dynamic ordered probit model 
of Eichengreen et al. (1985) and Dueker (1999). This model is more suitable to 
combine the binary information of the unconventional monetary announcements with 
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an otherwise standard VAR; i.e. it allows the use of unconventional policy 
announcements as an endogenous factor of the system. Within this setting, all of the 
covariates in the model constitute the same vector autoregressive system, and in order 
to produce multi-step forecasts only the dependent variable's own history is needed 
(see, Meinusch and Tillmann, 2016; Assenmacher-Wesche and Dueker, 2010; 
Tillmann, 2014; Bordo et al., 2008; Amstad et al., 2008). The continuous latent 
variable deriving from the model mirrors the propensity to unconventional monetary 
policy, and results after the estimation of the dynamic probit model through Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques.  
 
More specifically, consider a latent variable  𝑦∗ as shown in equation (2) to determine 
unconventional monetary policy measures. It is defined as an autoregressive process 
of order ρ depending on a constant δ, its own lagged values and a set of lagged 
explanatory variables 𝑋𝑡−𝛲; φ and β are vectors of the coefficients; 𝑒𝑡  is a random 
error term following standard normal distribution and t = 1,…, T is the time index: 
 
              𝑦𝑡
∗ = 𝛿 + ∑ 𝜑𝑙𝑦𝑡−𝑙
∗
𝜌
𝑙=1
∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑋𝑡−𝑙 + 𝑒𝑡
𝜌
𝑙=1
,        𝑒𝑡 ~𝑁(0,1).                                     (2) 
 
The binary variable 𝑦𝑡 takes the value one if unconventional policy actions occur in 
period t and zero otherwise. With the use of equation (2), the value of the binary 
variable 𝑦𝑡 takes the form: 
 
                                             𝑦𝑡 = {
0      𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑡
∗ ≤ 0
1      𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑡
∗ ≥ 0 
                                                          (3) 
 
14 
 
The second component of the model, is a VAR (ρ) process for the dynamics of k 
regressors: 
                        𝑌𝑡 = 𝜇 + ∑ 𝛷
𝑙
𝜌
𝑙=1
𝑌𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜈𝑡,         𝜈𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝛴)                                            (4) 
 
with a k ×1 vector 𝑌𝑡 = (𝑋𝑡, 𝑦𝑡
∗)′. k −1 time series of observed macroeconomic data 
constitute the 𝑋𝑡 while  𝑦𝑡
∗  complements a vector of the latent variable. The set of 
VAR coefficients are shown as: 
 
                                       𝛷𝑙 = [
𝛷𝑋𝑋
(𝑙)
𝛷𝑋𝑦∗
(𝑙)
 𝛷𝑦∗𝑋
(𝑙)
𝛷𝑦∗𝑦∗
(𝑙)
]                          (5) 
         
In (4) μ is a k ×1 vector of constants and 𝜈𝑡 comprises the k ×1 error vector and the 
covariance matrix of the errors is Σ. The complete Qual VAR system derives from the 
linear relation between the latent variable (the ECB's propensity for unconventional 
measures in our case) and the regressors. 
 
Dueker (2005) and Assenmacher-Wesche and Dueker (2010) show that the model can 
be estimated by MCMC techniques, in particular via Gibbs Sampling, which is able to 
generate posterior samples by sweeping through each variable (or block of variables) 
to sample from its conditional distribution, while the rest variables remain fixed to 
their current values. Gibbs Sampling implements the joint estimation of the VAR 
coefficients Φ, the covariance matrix of the VAR residuals Σ and the latent 
variable 𝑦𝑡
∗. The draws are generated from the iterative algorithm (for more details, 
see Dueker, 2005; Assenmacher-Wesche and Dueker, 2010). In a second step, the 
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Kalman Smoothing is implemented from which we obtain the mean and the variance 
of the states, e.g. the latent variable, conditional on its past and future values and on 
the rest data. The Smoother uses initial values, collected from the binary data for the 
latent variable and from OLS estimates for the coefficients given the binary data. 
Then, a latent variable, which is based on the first two moments, is drawn from the 
truncated Normal for each period. In the third step, the VAR model is estimated, 
using the sampled time series of the latent variable and OLS estimates for Φ and Σ, 
denoted by ?̂? and ?̂?.  
 
The above information and the assumed Jeffrey's prior, conduct a draw for Σ from the 
inverted Wishart distribution with T − k degrees of freedom. T mirrors the number of 
observations, k the number of explanatory variables and (𝛵?̂?)−1  describes the 
covariance from OLS:    
 
                                                  𝛴 ~ 𝐼𝑊 {((𝛵?̂?)
−1
, 𝑇 − 𝑘}                                                 (6) 
 
Since the variance of the latent variable is equal to one, we equally adjust the 
appropriate element in Σ and normalize the other elements in the corresponding 
column. After adding the OLS estimates mean to a draw following a multivariate 
Normal distribution with a covariance matrix which stands for the Kronecker product, 
draws for Φ ,given Σ ,derive of the draw for Σ and (𝑌′𝑌)−1: 
 
                                                    𝛷 ~ 𝛮 { 𝛷,̂ 𝛴 ⊗ (𝑌′𝑌)−1 }                                         (7) 
 
16 
 
For a sufficiently large number of iterations, the draw from either conditional 
distribution represents actually a draw from the joint posterior distribution. As in 
Dueker (2005), we run the Gibbs sampling for 10,000 iterations from which the first 
5,000 are discarded to allow for convergence towards the posterior distribution. 
Draws of the VAR coefficients that were not satisfying stationarity were rejected and 
resampled. From the resulting sample the mean of the latent variable, the VAR 
coefficients and the variance were derived. The binary index enters the Qual VAR as 
𝑦𝑡 {0, 1} and together with the remaining variables in the 𝑋𝑡 vector are used to derive 
the ECB’s latent propensity to unconventional monetary policy measures, 𝑦𝑡
∗ (ystar). 
The model also includes variables that capture the Eurozone business cycle, the 
financial markets’ response on ECB’s unconventional monetary policy stance, and 
expectations (IP, HICP, Stock_Ret, Unemploym, Tradebal, ESI). We conclude to a 
seven-variable Qual VAR model i.e.: IP, HICP(CPI), ystar, Stock_Ret, Unemploym, 
Tradebal, ESI (MCSI).  
 
Nevertheless, in order to keep our model as parsimonious as possible, we tested the 
results after adopting a five-variable model as follows: IP, HICP(CPI), ystar, 
Stock_Ret, ESI(MCSI). The results remained qualitatively the same (available upon 
request). The model is estimated in first differences in order the variables to be 
stationary and thus consistent with the assumptions in the MCMC estimations, as well 
as with the concept of the latent variable reflecting the propensity to unconventional 
measures. The recursive ordering we follow is according to Christiano et al. (1999), 
while alternative orderings produce qualitatively the same results. As lag selection 
criteria are not defined for binary data we choose to use three lags in our Qual VAR 
system, which is appropriate for a short sample according to Meinusch and Tillmann, 
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(2016). We also implement multivariate Q-tests which confirm the absence of serial 
correlation in the residuals of each estimated model. 
 
3.3. The Impact of Unconventional Monetary Policy: A FAVAR approach  
 
In order to robust the results regarding the effect of ECB’s unconventional monetary 
policy on investor sentiment, we also employ a structural Factor-Augmented Vector 
AutoRegression (FAVAR) model (Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (BBE; 2005) and 
Boivin, Giannoni, and Mihov (BGM; 2009)) in a large dataset of monthly time series 
of nine EU counties. The FAVAR model is quite advantageous, as it employs a large 
number of informative macroeconomic and financial time series used by investors and 
policymakers, by combining the standard VAR analysis with factor analysis. After 
identification, structural IRFs can be produced for all variables in the dataset. Thus, 
with the use of the FAVAR model, the potential omitted variable issues mostly seen 
in standard VAR models can be prevented (e.g. the ‘‘price puzzle” of Sims, 1992). 
  
Most of the studies adopting a FAVAR approach to investigate monetary transmission 
are related to the US (see e.g. Bernanke et al., 2005; Stock and Watson, 2005; Favero 
et al., 2005; Belviso and Milani, 2006; Boivin et al., 2009; Boivin and Giannoni, 
2008; Lutz, 2015; Gabriel and Lutz, 2015), while only few are based on the monetary 
policy effects in the euro-area.  Examples of studies related to the euro-area are 
McCallum and Smets (2007), who employ a FAVAR model in order to capture the 
effects of monetary policy shocks on real wages and employment in individual 
countries and the euro area as whole as well, or Eickmeier (2009), who investigates 
comovements and heterogeneity in the euro area based on a structural dynamic factor 
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model of Forni and Reichlin (1998). Also Blaes (2009), adopting the FAVAR model 
of BBE, studies the transmission of monetary policy in the euro area for the period 
1986 to 2006, while Boivin et al. (2008), employ the FAVAR approach of BBE and 
investigate potential differences in the monetary transmission of individual euro area 
countries.  
 
Our paper differentiates from the existing literature, as its focus is on the 
unconventional monetary transmission studying the effect of a common 
unconventional monetary policy shock of the various euro area countries, in contrast 
to Normandin (2006) who employs separate VARs for different counties. Similar to 
BBE and BGM who study the effect of the fed funds rate on unemployment, output, 
and prices by employing a FAVAR model, we use the FAVAR model in order to 
study the effect of ECB’s unconventional monetary policy stance on investor 
sentiment in Europe. Moreover, as discussed above, it is the first paper that uses the 
latent propensity for ECB’s unconventional monetary stance deriving from a Qual 
VAR model (Dueker, 2005) as a monetary instrument, combining this way, a Qual 
VAR and a FAVAR model. A brief description of the FAVAR model is presented in 
Appendix D.  
 
The monetary policy shocks are identified using a Cholesky identification scheme, 
under the assumption that the monetary policy variable comes last at the ordering, 
meaning that it affects the unobserved factors, 𝐹𝑡, with only one lag. The lag length of 
three is selected in our FAVAR model, with the results being robust to alternative lag 
lengths. Although Bai and Ng (2002) provide a criterion to choose the number of 
factors, BBE state that the decision of the number of the factors in the model comes 
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through the exploitation of the sensitivity of the results to an alternative number of 
factors. We follow BBE and use three factors in our model. Nevertheless, the effect of 
monetary policy remains qualitatively the same by the use of five factors or even after 
further increases in the number of factors. Our monetary policy instrument, is the 
latent propensity for ECB’s unconventional monetary stance, y∗(ystar), deriving from 
the Qual VAR model. As the Qual VAR model was estimated for each of the nine 
countries separately, a principal component analysis to the country specific latent 
propensities was conducted, in order to produce a latent propensity for ECB’s 
unconventional monetary stance for the euro area as a whole, in order to be used in 
the FAVAR model.
5
 Our dataset includes a large number of macroeconomic 
indicators chosen from the following categories: real output and income; employment; 
prices; exchange rates; interest rates; stock prices; money aggregates; consumption; 
labor cost; sentiment indicators; and some foreign variables (VIX, VSTOXX, 
S&P500). Our dataset consists of a balanced panel of 328 monthly time series for nine 
euro-area countries from May 2007 to October 2012. The dataset includes 35 country-
specific variables for each of the nine countries in our sample and 13 common 
variables (see Appendix C, for a description of the variables).  
 
As we intended to work with a balanced panel of monthly series, we had to 
disaggregate some quarterly series into monthly ones, using the cubic spline 
interpolation.
6
 All variables - with the exception of interest rates - are transformed in 
logs and, if necessary, differentiated to induce stationarity. All “informational” series 
used to compute the factors were standardised to have mean zero and unit variance, in 
                                                        
5 The latent propensity for ECB’s unconventional monetary stance for the euro area was produced after 
PCA analysis for both Qual VAR models (5-variable and 7-variable Qual VAR models). The results 
from the FAVAR model remained qualitatively the same. 
6
 This approach has been used in many previous studies for this type of transformations (see, among 
others, Bernanke, et. al. 1997; Abbate, et.al. 2016; Lescaroux and Mignon, 2009). 
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order to overcome the impair factor extraction issue due to the different scales of the 
time series.  
 
4. Results 
 
In Table 1, Panel A, we present descriptive statistics for the main variables. The panel 
unit root tests of Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003; IPS test) suggest that we strongly reject the 
null hypothesis of a unit root, for all sample variables (available upon request). The 
next step is the lag selection for the PVAR model. In order to decide on the lag 
structure we use the overall coefficient of determination (CD). The results are 
presented in Table 1 (Panel B) and indicate that the optimal lag structure is one lag. 
Nevertheless, in order to enhance a 7–variable VAR model with richer dynamics, we 
choose a panel VAR model with three lags (apart from Peripheral countries for the 
2007-2010 period and Core and Peripheral countries for the 2010-2012 period, where 
due to fewer observations than parameters, the lags are two). In Panel C (Table 1) we 
report evidence on the stability properties of the estimated PVAR model, which 
requires the moduli of the eigenvalues of the dynamic matrix to lie within the unit 
circle, which is the case in our estimated model (see also, Figure 1).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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To identify monetary policy shocks, we follow Christiano et al. (1999). We use a 
Cholesky decomposition based on the following ordering
7
 of the variables: IP, HICP, 
MROr, Stock_Ret, Unemploym, Tradebal, ESI. Note that we also employ alternative 
orderings such as the monetary shock identification of Bloom (2009) (e.g. Stock_Ret,, 
HICP, MROr, IP, Unemploym, Tradebal, ESI), while we also estimate a 5-variable 
panel VAR (excluding trade balance and unemployment). The results (available upon 
request) remain qualitatively the same. We focus and present results on the underlying 
moving average (MA) representation of the VAR model, i.e. the impulse response 
functions (IRFs) and the associated Forecast Error Variance Decompositions 
(FEVDs). These two combined, convey information on how each variable responds to 
a surprise change (a shock) to another variable in the system.  
 
4.1. The effect of ECB’s Conventional Policy on Eurozone expectations  
 
This sub-section presents results obtained with the Panel VAR model on the effect of 
Conventional Policy (proxied by the Main Refinancing Operations rate, MROr) on 
expectations. Table 2 presents the results from the ESI FEVDs, i.e. the percentage of 
sentiment variance that is explained by each variable. Panel A presents results for the 
full sample and Panel B (C) for the period 2007-2010 (2010-2012). Note that we 
perform variance decomposition analysis for all variables; however, we concentrate 
and report here only the results for sentiment. We find that for the full sample period 
(Panel A) the MRO rate contributes 5.46% to the variance of sentiment for all 
Eurozone countries, 9.8% to the Core countries, and 2.3% for the Peripheral 
countries. During the 2007-2010 (2010-2012) period the MRO rate contributes 5.51% 
                                                        
7
 Lutkepohl and Poskitt (1991) argue that the ordering of the variables makes little difference when the 
residual correlation is small. 
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(3.89%) to the variance of sentiment for all Eurozone countries, 9% (16.74%) for the 
Core countries, and 7.14% (1.92%) for the Peripheral countries. Equity market returns 
seem to also be an important contributor to sentiment variance: between 2007 and 
2010 equity returns contribute approximately 28.55% to sentiment variance for the 
Eurozone countries. The important result that emerges from this Table is that during 
the EU crisis (2010-2012) ECB’s conventional monetary policy appears to contribute 
to about 16.74% to Core countries economic expectations variance, while it 
contributes to only about 1.92% to Peripheral countries economic expectations 
variance. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.2. The effect of Fed’s conventional monetary policy on Eurozone expectations 
 
This sub-section presents results obtained with the Panel VAR model on the effect of 
Fed’s monetary policy stance on Eurozone expectations. The results are presented in 
Table 3, which is organized in the same way as Table 2. The shadow Fed funds rate is 
used to capture the effect of Fed’s conventional monetary policy stance and is listed 
first in the Cholesky ordering as the most exogenous in the system. Following Dees et 
al. (2007), we are implicitly assuming that the US economy affects but does not 
respond to developments in other economies. Alternative orderings produced 
qualitatively the same results. As can be seen in Table 3, during the full sample period 
(Panel A) the Fed policy accounts for 2.75% of Eurozone expectations variance 
(4.11% to the Core countries sentiment variance and 2.71% to Peripheral countries 
sentiment variance). For the 2007-2010 period, these percentages rise to 
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approximately 5%, 7%, and 5%, respectively. In other words, Fed’s monetary policy 
stance also seems to affect to some extent expectations in the Eurozone.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.3. Sentiment Spill-Over Effects between the US and the Eurozone   
 
The results, so far, indicate that conventional ECB monetary policy seems to have a 
significant effect on the expectations of Core countries but a much smaller effect on 
the expectations of Peripheral countries. Fed’s monetary policy stance also seems to 
affect to some extent expectations in the Eurozone. A related interesting issue is 
whether there are sentiment spill-over effects from the US to the Euro-area. This sub-
section presents results obtained with the Panel VAR model on the effect of US 
expectations on Eurozone expectations. Table 4 reports FEVD results on the 
contribution of US expectations (captured by MCSI) to the sentiment variance of 
Eurozone. The MCSI is listed after the ECB monetary policy stance to the Cholesky 
ordering, assuming that the US sentiment does not have a contemporaneous effect on 
EU monetary developments but only a delayed one. Alternative orderings were tested 
and produced qualitatively the same results. On average, US sentiment contributes 
anything between of 1% and 8% (approximately) to the variance of European 
sentiment, depending on the period and sample. An interesting result that emerges 
from this Table is that, during the US crisis, economic sentiment in the US contributes 
to about 7.97% to Core country expectations variance while it contributes to only 
1.01% Peripheral country economic sentiment.  
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[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.4. Further tests: spillover matrices and variable ordering 
 
This sub-section presents further results on conventional ECB monetary policy 
(MRO) on Core and Peripheral countries during both the US and the EU crisis. More 
specifically, Table 5 presents the spillover matrices of Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 
2012); within this framework forecast error variance decompositions are invariant to 
variable ordering. Panels A and B present results for the US crisis for the Core and 
Peripheral countries, respectively, while Panels C and D present results for the EU 
crisis for the Core and Peripheral countries, respectively. One way to read the Table is 
to focus on the Sum Out and Sum In columns and rows, which show the aggregate 
impact of shocks sent to and received from the other variables in the system. For 
instance, the results for the Peripheral countries in Panel B (Sum Out column) indicate 
that during the financial crisis (US) the amount of shocks sent by the MRO rate to all 
other variables is the biggest compared to all other variables in the system (120.23) 
with economic sentiment being the second (112.29). This holds also for the Peripheral 
countries during the sovereign debt crisis (EU, Panel D) where the MRO rate is the 
variable with the biggest impact (155.12) followed by trade balance (141.27) and 
economic sentiment (138.38). The results for the Core countries during the US 
financial crisis which are presented in Panel A (Sum Out column), indicate that the 
amount of shocks sent by the MRO rate to all other variables is also first compared to 
all other variables in the system (77.51).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
25 
 
 
When we consider the net contribution of each variable (Net row) we can see that, 
during the US crisis, the MRO rate is a net sender of shocks for both the Core 
countries (Panel A, 9.8) and especially for the Peripheral countries (Panel B, 60.3). 
During the EU crisis in Core countries (Panel C) the MRO rate appears to be the 
second most important net receiver of shocks (-20.36) while the economic sentiment 
is the second most important net sender (29.43). These results suggest that during the 
EU crisis the MRO rate appears to be the single most important net sender of shocks 
to the Peripheral countries, while for the Core countries it is the second most 
important net receiver. The ESI is the second most important net sender of shocks to 
both Core and Peripheral countries. These results are consistent with the notion that 
monetary policy and economic expectations have been significant contributors to the 
outcome of the US and EU financial crisis.   
 
4.5. Impulse Response Functions (IRFs)  
 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 present orthogonalized Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) and 
the 95% error bands generated by Monte Carlo simulation (200 repetitions) obtained 
with the Panel VAR model on the effect of Conventional Policy (proxied by the Main 
Refinancing Operations rate, MROr) on expectations. More specifically, Figure 2 
presents the IRFs for the Eurozone, Core, and Peripheral countries, during the full 
sample period and the two sub-periods discussed above. Figure 3 presents IRFs on the 
response of the ESI variable to a shock in ECB Main Refinancing Operations rate 
(MROr) at a country level.  
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Our attention should lie with the Core countries mainly, since for these countries we 
detected a significant effect according to the FEVDs (see Table 2). Figure 2 indicates 
that during the full sample period a contractionary monetary shock leads to a 
statistically significant decrease in the Core countries sentiment that lasts for 2-4 
months after the policy shock. For the 2007-2010 period, a one standard deviation 
positive shock to the monetary policy rate, causes a decrease to Core countries 
sentiment, two months approximately after the policy shock. During the EU sovereign 
debt crisis (2010-2012), the Core economic sentiment declines to almost 0.7 
percentage points, following a monetary contraction after about 1 month, with a 
statistically significant effect. The country specific responses to a monetary shock 
(Figure 3) confirm this finding. In other words, a decrease in ECB rates has a positive 
effect on economic expectations, a result consistent with previous findings on Fed 
conventional policy.   
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Next we examine, the response of Eurozone economic sentiment (ESI) to a shock in 
Feds conventional monetary policy (proxied by the shadow Federal Funds rate), 
obtained with the Panel VAR model. As can be seen in Figure 4, a contractionary US 
monetary policy shock causes a decline in the Core countries economic sentiment, 
which touches a maximum three months after the US policy shock. Overall, the 
results in this sub-section suggest that both ECB’s conventional monetary stance and 
Fed’s monetary stance had a positive effect on economic expectations/sentiment in 
Core countries. 
 [INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
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4.6. Unconventional Monetary Policy – A Qual VAR approach 
 
This section presents the results for ECB’s unconventional monetary policy on 
economic expectations. More specifically, we employ the Qual VAR model discussed 
in sub-section 3.2 in order to derive the ECB’s latent propensity to unconventional 
monetary policy measures, (ystar), based on our initial binary variable. We then 
employ this continuous variable in our Panel VAR model for all variables and country 
groups in a panel data set.
8
 Figure 5 presents this variable for each country, i.e. the 
estimated latent propensity to unconventional monetary policy measures for each one 
of the sample countries. During the announcement dates (shaded areas) this series is 
required to be positive (Meinusch and Tillmann, 2016). The ECB’s latent propensities 
appear very similar for countries, an expected result since ECB’s monetary stance is 
common. The sharp increases underline their magnitude. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 6 presents the FEVD results for the different country groups after running a 
panel VAR with 1, 2 and 3 lags (Panel A, B and C, respectively). The results indicate 
that unconventional measures had a significant effect to economic sentiment 
especially in the Core countries, where 12.8%, 12.6% and 10.6% of the total variance 
is explained, with 1, 2 and 3 lags respectively. Unconventional policy shocks account 
                                                        
8
 Note that we also try alternative Cholesky orderings and the results remain qualitatively the same. We 
first adopt a standard approach (Christiano et al., 1999) such as IP, HICP, ystar, Stock_Ret, 
Unemploym, Tradebal, ESI, and then try another approach (Bloom, 2009) as follows: Stock_Ret, 
HICP, ystar, IP, Unemploym, Tradebal, ESI. We report here results for the former, however, 
alternative results are available upon request.  
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for a less sizable portion of economic expectations in Peripheral countries, with a total 
contribution of 2.41%, 4.7% and 7.94% to the total variation, with 1, 2 and 3 lags, 
respectively. Note that equity market returns seem to also be an important contributor 
to sentiment variance.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) from this model are presented in Figure 6. 
More specifically, in Figure 6, Panel A presents the response of the ESI to an 
unexpected increase in the ECB’s propensity to unconventional monetary policy 
measures by one standard deviation for each country group, which is obtained from a 
Panel VAR specification, while Panel B presents the response of the ESI for each 
country separately. The results in Panel A suggest that an increase in the ECB’s 
propensity to unconventional monetary policy decreases investors’ sentiment: more 
specifically, for the first and second month, following the monetary policy impulse, 
the Core countries investors’ expectations experience a decrease of approximately 0.7 
percentage points. The results in Panel B indicate that in Belgium, Austria, France and 
the Netherlands, a monetary policy shock decreases expectations during the first two 
months, while in Germany, Spain, Italy, and Greece expectations turn positive 2-4 
months after the monetary policy shock. Overall, the results in this sub-section 
indicate that ECB’s unconventional monetary policy has a negative and significant 
contribution to the expectation variation in Core countries, while it has a positive 
effect on peripheral countries and Germany.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
29 
 
 
4.7. The US case 
 
In this section, for comparative purposes, we investigate how Fed’s unconventional 
monetary policy affected expectations (proxied by the MCSI) in the US. The 
methodology, i.e. the estimation of the Qual VAR is the same as in the previous sub-
section, and the binary variable of QE announcements is also constructed in a similar 
manner as above, and according to Fratzscher et al. (2013) and Fratzscher et al. 
(2014) (see Appendix B). Our results of the FEVDs to a latent propensity to QE shock 
are presented in Table 6 (Panel D) and indicate that an impulse to unconventional 
policy explains 6.8% in expectations total variation. The Fed’s latent propensity to QE 
and the IRFs are presented in Figure 7. The IRFs indicate that unconventional policies 
raise US expectations: during the first two months after the QE shock a rise in 
consumer sentiment of 1.2 percentage points is detected. These results are consistent 
with the results of Lutz (2015). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.8. Unconventional Monetary Policy and Expectations: a FAVAR approach 
  
This section reports the effect of ECB’s unconventional policy on Eurozone economic 
expectations, employing the FAVAR model presented in sub-section 3.4. In Table 7, 
we report only the results for the Economic Sentiment Indicator for each sample 
country (the rest of the results are available upon request). The last column of Table 7 
reports the 𝑅2 of the common component for each of the variables of interest, that is 
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the fraction of the variance of the country-specific ESI that is explained by the 
common factors 𝐹𝑡 and 𝑅𝑡 . The second and third columns show the Forecast Error 
Variance Decomposition at the 10-month horizon and at the 20-month horizon, 
respectively. It is clear that the contribution of the policy shock in the Core countries’ 
ESI is of greater importance than the one of the Peripheral countries. For instance, an 
unconventional monetary policy shock explains in a 10-month horizon 8.03%, 4.05%, 
4.44%, 4.87 and 4.27% of the ESI variance for Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, 
and the of the Netherlands, respectively. In contrast, an unconventional monetary 
policy shock explains in a 10-month horizon 3.1%, 1,4%, 2.4% and 3.3% of the ESI 
variance for Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece, respectively. The results remain 
qualitatively the same after a 20-month horizon (third column). Looking at the 𝑅2 of 
the common component, we note that the factors explain a sizeable fraction of the 
Core countries ESI, while for the Peripheral countries ESI the 𝑅2 is quite low. More 
specifically, the 𝑅2 in the Core countries varies from 50% to 67% while the 𝑅2 in the 
Peripheral countries varies from 24% to 35%.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 8 shows the estimated impulse responses (IRFs) for the Economic Sentiment 
Indicators for each sample country. Note here that less confidence should be placed 
on the IRFs of variables with low 𝑅2 (see BBE) and low FEVDs, as well, i.e. these of 
the peripheral countries. The IRFs in Figure 8 indicate that the pattern is similar for all 
Core countries; the response of investor sentiment to an unexpected increase in the 
ECB’s latent propensity to unconventional measures is negative for the first five 
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months, when it eventually turns positive for almost two to four months until it 
becomes insignificant. Thus, it can be argued that in the short-term the ECB’s 
unconventional monetary policy stance had a negative impact on investors’ 
expectations, while in the medium and longer term this effect became positive. 
Overall, the FAVAR methodology, which employs a significantly richer data 
environment and provides a more comprehensive and complete picture of the effects 
of policy innovations on economic expectations, produces results consistent with the 
results obtained in previous sub-sections.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This paper examines the effect of ECB’s conventional and unconventional monetary 
policies during the EU crisis on economic expectations. We employ a range of 
research methodologies (PVAR, QVAR, FAVAR) and a sample of nine Eurozone 
countries. We combine expectations/sentiment indicators with a set of 
macroeconomic and financial variables such as equity prices, industrial production, 
unemployment, trade balance and consumer price indexes. The results indicate that 
ECB’s conventional monetary policy (and Fed’s monetary policy stance) has a 
positive and significant effect on economic expectations for Core Eurozone countries, 
and a significantly weaker effect on Peripheral countries. In addition, during the US 
financial crisis, we detect sentiment spill-over effects from the US to the Core 
Eurozone countries. Moreover, during the EU crisis, the MRO rate appears to be the 
single most important net sender of shocks to the Peripheral countries, while for the 
Core countries it is the second most important net receiver. As regards to 
unconventional measures, we find that they have a significant effect to the variation in 
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expectations especially for the Core countries. Also, in the short-term the ECB’s 
unconventional monetary policy stance had a negative impact on investors’ 
expectations, while in the longer term the effect becomes positive. 
 
These results are consistent with the notion that monetary policy and economic 
expectations have been significant contributors to the outcome of the US and EU 
financial crisis. Our results, however, indicate that the effects of ECB’s 
unconventional measures were less efficient than conventional measures on 
expectations. That is, in contrast to the Fed, ECB’s unconventional policies had a 
negative short-term impact on economic expectations. As discussed in the 
introduction, this finding can perhaps be explained by the different nature of 
unconventional strategies the two central banks followed after 2010 and the different 
challenges they faced. Given the absence of any mechanisms that can tackle the side 
effects of this strategic divergence, empirical evidence that sheds light on the effects 
of non-standard policies is crucial in understanding its effectiveness. 
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APPENDIX A: Press coverage of ECB actions  
 
Date Event  
Financial Times 
Headline Headline Article 
Front 
page VIX  Dummy  
28/3/2008 6 month SLTROs 
US sends in back-up for 
Iraqi No No -0.17 AN_SLTROs 
  
offensive 
    
4/9/2008 
Roll over of the outstanding 6 month 
SLTROs 
US stock s suffer on fear 
for No No 2.6 AN_SLTROs 
  
economy 
    
15/10/2008 6 month SLTROs and other measures 
Fresh squall rattles 
mark ets No No 14.12 AN_SLTROs 
       
7/5/2009 12 month SLTROs and other measures 
Us banks must add 
$74.6bn in No text 0.99 AN_SLTROs 
 
(including covered bond purchases) equity 
    
4/6/2009 Details for the purchase programme of 
Obama appeal to 
muslims No No -0.84 
 
 
covered bonds 
     
10/5/2010 SMP and other measures 
Markets rally on EU 
bail-out main text       -     -12.11 AN_SMP 
       
30/6/2010 Completion of covered bond purchases  
EU bank bonus rules 
sow No No 0.41 
 
  
confusion 
    4/8/2011 SLTROs and other measures Stock markets plunge main text        - 8.28 
 
  
worldwide 
    7/8/2011 SMP reactivation Traders braced for more main text        - 16 AN_SMP 
  
turmoil 
    
6/10/2011 12 month SLTROs and covered bond 
ECB raids policy 
cupboard title        - -1.54 AN_SLTROs 
 
purchases 
     
8/12/2011 36 month VLTROs and other measures 
European banks’ 
shortfall at  -         - 1.92 
 
  
€115bn 
    
26/7/2012 Mr. Draghi's Speech "Whatever it 
Nomura axe falls on top 
staff No title -1.81 AN_OMT 
 
takes" 
     
6/9/2012 Details for the OMT 
ECB signals resolve to 
save title        - -2.14 AN_OMT 
    euro         
       Notes to Appendix A 
Column “Event” describes the policy announcement; “Financial Times Headline” indicates the title of 
the “top story” on the front page of the Financial Times; “Headline Article” indicates where the ECB 
action is mentioned in the top story on the front page of the Financial Times (title, subtitle or main 
text); “Front page” indicates where the ECB action is mentioned on the front page of the Financial 
Times, if not in the “top story” (title, subtitle or main text). “VIX” indicates the change in the VIX on 
the day of the announcement; “dummy” indicates the impulse dummy capturing announcements effects 
in the baseline analysis. 
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APPENDIX B: Press coverage of FED actions  
 
Date Event  
Financial Times 
Headline Headline Article 
Front 
page VIX  Dummy  
25/11/2008 LSAPs announced Fed adds $800bn to boost title        -     -3.80 AN_QE1 
  
borrowing 
    
1/12/2008 Bernanke first suggestion of extending  
Evidence of deep 
recession main text        -     13.23 
 
 
QE to Treasuries mounts 
    
16/12/2008 First suggestion of extending QE to 
US Fed slashesrates to 
near main text        -     -4.39 AN_QE1 
 
Treasuries by FOMC zero 
    
28/1/2009 Fed stands ready toexpand QE and  
Economic pain to be 
'worst for main text        -     -2.59 AN_QE1 
 
buy Treasuries 60years' 
    18/3/2009 QEs expanded Fed purchase plan stuns  title         -     -0.74 AN_QE1 
  
investors 
    
27/8/2010 Bernanke suggests role for additional  
Fed ready to boost 
economy title         -     -2.92 AN_QE2 
 
QE 
     
12/10/2010 FOMC says additional accomodation  
Fresh Fed boost more 
likely title        - -0.03 
 
 
may be appropriate 
     15/10/2010 Bernanke says Fed stands ready for Bernanke hints at further title        - -0.85 AN_QE2 
 
action stimulus 
    
3/11/2010 QE2 announced 
Fed to pump in extra 
$600bn title        - -2.01 AN_QE2 
       
21/9/2011 Maturity Extension Programm announced 
Fed 'twist' seeks to boost 
US  title        - 4.46 
 
  
economy 
    20/6/2012 Maturity Extension Programm extended Fed opts to extend its title        - -1.14 
 
  
Operation Twist' plan 
    22/8/2012 FOMC says additional monetary SA mining unrest spreads No title 0.09 AN_QE3 
 
accomodation is likely 
     
13/9/2012 QE3 announced 
Bernanke takes plunge 
with title        - -1.75 AN_QE3 
  
QE3 
    
12/12/2012 QE3 expanded 
Fed links interest rates to 
US  main text        - 0.38 
     unemployment  figures         
 
Notes to Appendix B 
See Notes to Appendix A. The focus is set on the fifteen “expansionary” announcements listed in Table 
1A in Fawley and Neely (2013). 
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APPENDIX C: Description of the data 
Country/Region Variable Country/Region Variable 
EU countries (DE, AT, BE, FR, 
NL, SP, IT, PT, GR) Industrial production excl. construction 
World  
Commodity oil price 
 
Industrial production: Manufacturing  S&P 500 Composite 
 
Industrial production: Energy  VIX-CBOE volatility index 
 
Industrial production: Intermediate goods  ECB Commodity price index 
 
Industrial production: Non-durable goods  
 
 
Industrial production: Durable goods  
 
 
Industrial production: Capital goods  
 
 
Unemployment over 25 years old  
 
 
Unemployment rate  
 
 
Producer Price Index: All items  
 
 
Producer Price Index: Manufacturing Aggregate euro-area  EUROSTOXX 50 
 
Producer Price Index: Energy variables Yen to EU exchange rate 
 
Producer Price Index: Intermediate goods  EU to UK exchange rate 
 
Producer Price Index: Non-durable goods  EU to USD exchange rate 
 
Producer Price Index: Durable goods  Real effective exchange rate 
 
Producer Price Index: Capital goods  EU individual consumption exp. 
 
Consumer Price Index: All items  Hourly labor cost 
 
Consumer Price Index: Food  Unit labor cost 
 
Consumer Price Index: Energy  VSTOXX 
 
Short-term interest rate nominal  
 
 
Long-term interest rate (gvt.bonds) nominal 
 
 
Capacity utilization rate  
 
 
Price deflator  
 
 
Final consumption expenditure  
 
 
M1  
 
 
M2  
 
 
M3  
 
 
GDP, real  
 
 
GDP deflator  
 
 
Private final consumption  
 
 
Unit labor cost  
 
 
Main stock price index  
 
 
Economic sentiment indicator  
 
 
Trade balance  
 
  
Harmonised index of consumer prices 
 
  
  
Notes to Appendix C 
The Table presents data directly taken from EIKON and Bloomberg. Transformations are as in Bernanke et al. (2005), Stock 
and Watson (2002), and Boivin et al. (2009). The second column presents the country specific variables for the nine countries 
of our sample (35 time series for each country), while the fourth column presents the common variables (13 time series). 
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APPENDIX D: Description of the FAVAR model 
 
We briefly present the FAVAR model, estimated by the two-step principal component 
approach (for more details see BBE and BGM). In the first step, a set of factors that 
capture the dynamics of financial markets derive from our large dataset through the 
principal component analysis (PCA), under the assumption that key interest rates, a 
vector of observed factors and a set of latent factors have an effect on financial 
markets.  In the second step, a standard VAR model is estimated, including the latent 
factors and the key interest rates and IRFs can be computed for all the variables in the 
system.  
 
Within the FAVAR framework, let 𝑁 × 1 a vector of macroeconomic time series 𝑋𝑡 
and assume that the evolution of the financial markets is affected by a 𝐾 × 1 vector of 
unobserved factors, 𝐹𝑡, and an observed factor, the policy instrument, 𝑅𝑡, such that: 
 
                                                     𝐶𝑡 = [
𝐹𝑡
𝑅𝑡
]                                                                             (8) 
 
The estimation of the observation equation using principal components appears as 
follows: 
                                    𝑋𝑡 = 𝛬
𝑓𝐹𝑡 + 𝛬
𝑟𝑅𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡                                                                (9) 
 
where 𝛬𝑓 , the 𝑁 × 𝐾 matrix of factor loadings, 𝛬𝑟 the 𝑁 × 1 vector of factor loadings, 
and 𝑒𝑡  the 𝑁 × 1 vector of error terms with mean zero, assumed to be serially and 
mutually weakly correlated. Then, we estimate the following standard VAR with the 
𝐶𝑡: 
 
                                     𝐶𝑡 = 𝛷(𝐿)𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡                                                                      (10) 
 
where 𝛷(𝐿) is the matrix of lag polynomials of finite order. After estimating the VAR 
model, we can study the IRFs and FEVDs deriving from the model. More specifically, 
we can investigate the effect of a policy shock by multiplying the IRFs derived from 
the VAR in Eq. (10) with the factor loadings from the observation equation. FEVDs 
are calculated using the augmented formula for the FAVAR model from BBE.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
MROr 594 -0.0454 0.1737 -0.75 0.25 
Stock_Ret 594 -0.0090 0.0736 -0.3260 0.1982 
IP 594 -0.0017 0.0230 -0.0884 0.0857 
Unemploym 594 0.0842 0.2156 -0.6101 1.0902 
Tradebal 594 0.5208 1.6521 -5.7691 3.9414 
HICP 594 0.0065 0.4220 -1.6011 2.3014 
ESI 594 -0.3936 2.5906 -10.8 7.2 
 
Panel B: Lag-order selection statistics for Panel VAR estimated using GMM 
 
  Lag CD   
  1 0.6758   
  2 0.7743   
  3 0.8268   
  4 0.9027   
      
 
Panel C: Roots of the Companion Matrix 
 
  Eigenvalue   
  Real Imaginary Modulus  
  0.5436 0 0.5436  
  -0.4037 0 0.4037  
  0.3566 0.0628 0.3621  
  0.3566       -0.0628 0.3621  
  -0.1097 0 0.1097  
  0.0924 0 0.0924  
  -0.0455 0 0.0455  
 
Notes to Table 1 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the following variables: The Main Refinancing Operations 
rate (denoted as MROr), the Stock market returns (denoted as Stock_Ret), the Industrial Production 
index (denoted as IP), the Unemployment rate (denoted as Unemploym), the Trade balance (denoted as 
Tradebal), the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (denoted as HICP) and the Economic Sentiment 
Indicator (denoted as ESI). All of the time series are transformed to ensure stationarity; Main 
Refinancing Operations rate, Unemployment rate, Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices and 
Economic Sentiment Indicator are used in first differences, Stock market returns and Industrial 
Production in log differences while trade balance in growth rate. All data are monthly and obtained 
from EIKON and Bloomberg. The sample covers the period between May 2007 and October 2012. 
Panel B presents test results for the optimal lag structure. CD is the overall coefficient of determination. 
Panel C: the stability of the PVAR requires the moduli of the eigenvalues of the dynamic matrix to lie 
within the unit circle, which is the case in the estimated model (Lütkepohl, 2005). 
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                                                               Table 2 
Conventional ECB Policy: Variance Decomposition Analysis  
 
  
 
Impulse variables 
 
Response variable IP HICP MROr Stock_Ret Unemploym Tradebal ESI 
 
Panel A: 2007 – 2012 
 
Eurozone countries 
ESI 5.33 0.75 5.46 17.26 1.48 0.87 68.81 
Core countries 
ESI 3.96 2.32 9.80 21.94 1.18 1.37 59.45 
Peripheral countries 
ESI 8.13 1.16 2.30 10.29 1.46 0.83 75.79 
 
Panel B: 2007 – 2010 
 
Eurozone countries 
ESI 3.47 3.65 5.51 28.55 1.65 1.39 55.74 
Core countries 
ESI 1.94 7.01 9.00 25.67 1.63 3.22 51.50 
Peripheral countries 
ESI 7.80 0.74 7.14 14.79 11.08 44.76 13.67 
 
Panel C: 2010 – 2012 
 
Eurozone countries 
ESI 2.82 6.13 3.89 7.78 17.41 19.95 41.99 
Core countries 
ESI 11.23 1.30 16.74 11.2 3.34 6.20 50.00 
Peripheral countries 
ESI 0.38 8.11 1.92 41.5 15.37 9.91 22.79 
 
Notes to Table 2 
The Table presents results for Variance Decomposition Analysis, i.e. the contribution of each variable 
to the variance in sentiment. Panel A presents results for the full sample, Panel B for the period 
between 2007 and 2010, while Panel C for the period between 2010 and 2012. The results were 
computed from a panel VAR with 3 lags, apart from Peripheral countries group for the 2007-2010 
period and Core countries and Peripheral countries group for the 2010-2012 period, in which due to 
fewer observations than parameters, the lags are two. Note that we perform variance decomposition 
analysis for all variables, however, we report here only the results for sentiment (the rest of the results 
are available upon request). Variables: Main Refinancing Operations rate (denoted as MROr), stock 
market returns (denoted as Stock_Ret), Industrial Production index (denoted as IP), unemployment rate 
(denoted as Unemploym), Trade balance (denoted as Tradebal), Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(denoted as HICP), Economic Sentiment Indicator (denoted as ESI). All time series are transformed to 
ensure stationarity; Main Refinancing Operations rate, Unemployment rate, Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices and Economic Sentiment Indicator are used in first differences, Stock market returns 
and Industrial Production in log differences while trade balance in growth rate. All data are monthly 
and obtained from EIKON and Bloomberg. 
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Table 3 
Fed’s Monetary Policy stance: Variance Decomposition Analysis  
 
  
 
Impulse variables 
 
Response variable FFr IP HICP MROr Stock_Ret Tradebal ESI 
 
Panel A: 2007 – 2012 
 
Eurozone countries 
ESI 2.75 5.64 0.39 17.26 5.98 1.02 66.65 
Core countries 
ESI 4.11 4.15 1.36 8.46 21.44 1.26 59.18 
Peripheral countries 
ESI 2.71 8.11 0.73 3.68 13.21 0.34 71.17 
 
Panel B: 2007 – 2010 
 
Eurozone countries 
ESI 5.07 3.85 3.61 5.67 25.01 2.02 54.74 
Core countries 
ESI 7.01 2.72 5.91 7.47 25.53 3.58 48.57 
Peripheral countries 
ESI 4.9 4.86 1.52 8.13 8.03 61.16 11.37 
 
Panel C: 2010 – 2012 
 
Eurozone countries 
ESI 5.24 4.78 0.93 7.4 3.78 35.56 42.28 
Core countries 
ESI 4.26 10.52 2.15 16.29 10.77 6.82 49.16 
Peripheral countries 
ESI 0.52 3.21 1.93 3.06 2.64 37.44 51.17 
 
Notes to Table 3 
The Table presents results for Variance Decomposition Analysis, i.e. the contribution of each variable 
to the variance in sentiment. FFr is the Shadow Federal Funds rate estimated by Wu and Xia (2016). 
Panel A presents results for the full sample, Panel B for the period between 2007 and 2010, while Panel 
C for the period between 2010 and 2012. Note that we perform variance decomposition analysis for all 
variables, however, we report here only the results for sentiment (the rest of the results are available 
upon request). See also Notes to Table 2.  
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Table 4 
Variance Decomposition Analysis: Sentiment Spill-Overs from US to EU 
 
  
 
Impulse variables 
 
Response 
variable 
IP HICP MROr MCSI Stock_Ret Tradebal ESI 
 
Panel A: 2007 – 2012 
 
Eurozone countries 
ESI 5.97 0.5 6.42 4.51 17.23 0.7 64.63 
Core countries 
ESI 4.42 2.09 9.9 4.69 20.67 1.01 57.19 
Peripheral countries 
ESI 10.34 0.76 3.45 3.92 13.39 0.36 67.75 
 
Panel B: 2007 – 2010 
 
Eurozone countries 
ESI 4.36 3.24 7.1 5.78 28.86 1.12 49.51 
Core countries 
ESI 4.19 6.92 12.23 7.97 22.14 2.95 43.59 
Peripheral countries 
ESI 6.45 0.87 8.57 1.01 9.96 62.34 10.77 
 
Panel C: 2010 – 2012 
 
Eurozone countries 
ESI 5.11 0.89 8.15 2.43 4.71 28.26 50.42 
Core countries 
ESI 10.17 0.9 16 3.54 11.33 5.06 52.98 
Peripheral countries 
ESI 4.3 1.6 4.92 1.66 2.53 27.37 57.6 
 
Notes to Table 4 
Table 4 reports Variance Decomposition Analysis results with a focus on possible sentiment spill-overs 
from the US to EU. That is, we report the contribution of US sentiment to the sentiment variance of 
Eurozone, Core, and Peripheral countries, for three sample periods. The Table is organized in a similar 
manner to Table 3. The models include all variables, however, we report here only the results for the 
sentiment indexes. The recursive ordering occurs after the assumption that US investor sentiment may 
affect the stock markets in Europe, but is allowed to respond to IP, HICP and MROr within a given 
month. See also Notes to Table 2. 
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Table 5 
Spill-Over Matrices 
 
  
Panel A: Core countries / Financial Crisis (US) Panel C: Core countries / Sovereign Debt Crisis (EU) 
Response/Impulse IP HICP MROr Stock_Ret Unemploym Tradebal ESI Sum OUT IP HICP MROr Stock_Ret Unemploym Tradebal ESI Sum OUT 
IP 65.88 7.55 8.61 12.5 1.27 1.81 10.27 42.01 71.5 7.7 1.82 3.95 2.12 18.62 4.66 38.87 
HICP 3.13 63.43 21.4 16.95 6 5.61 4.99 58.08 3.48 54.98 4.46 1.66 8.18 36.95 1.45 56.18 
MROr 4.25 16.61 50.67 35.72 4.89 4.18 11.86 77.51 4.78 6.54 74.94 6.71 5.13 4.5 0.96 28.62 
Stock_Ret 3.51 3.79 8.6 77.39 1.51 2.73 9.32 29.46 2.05 4.58 19.25 64.47 3.08 10.09 8.65 47.7 
Unemploym 6.89 8.93 14.41 9.56 68.41 2.94 2.58 45.31 1.79 1.04 4.19 2.14 86.53 9.68 3.92 22.76 
Tradebal 2.47 2.84 1 1.77 0.77 91.63 0.94 9.79 1.57 1.57 2.71 0.71 7.02 92.5 3.06 16.64 
ESI 1.94 6.78 13.69 27.73 1.87 4.1 57.58 56.13 11.23 1.24 16.55 8.69 5.34 9.08 63.37 52.13 
Sum IN 22.19 46.5 67.71 104.23 16.31 21.37 39.96 318 24.9 22.67 48.98 23.86 30.87 88.92 22.7 263 
Net 19.82 11.58 9.8 -74.77 29 -11.58 16.17 0 13.97 33.51 -20.36 23.84 -8.11 -72.28 29.43 0 
  Panel B: Peripheral  countries  / Financial Crisis (US) Panel D: Peripheral countries / Sovereign Debt Crisis (EU) 
Response/Impulse IP HICP MROr Stock_Ret Unemploym Tradebal ESI Sum OUT IP HICP MROr Stock_Ret Unemploym Tradebal ESI Sum OUT 
IP 35.58 1.51 8.64 13.15 14.13 49.45 5.44 92.32 82.08 2.85 2.02 5.1 8.44 5.33 5.94 29.68 
HICP 9.93 36.88 21.38 24.07 21.45 23.51 7.54 107.89 5.19 38.8 2.76 36.53 22.3 32.61 22.57 121.96 
MROr 10.79 7.94 28.32 25.58 19.54 49.43 6.95 120.23 1 8.67 23.9 47.56 34.63 46.34 16.91 155.12 
Stock_Ret 7.34 2.45 4.43 37.21 9.91 55.13 10.63 89.89 1.76 10.11 1.98 54.86 38.94 42.68 18.44 113.91 
Unemploym 7.58 9.06 15.8 18.51 67.22 14.62 3.55 69.12 3.72 8.15 4 29.31 64.23 31.41 14.81 91.4 
Tradebal 1.9 2.18 2.11 3.09 4.57 89.14 2.82 16.67 0.08 11.3 1.93 57.93 40.84 68.79 29.18 141.27 
ESI 7.79 0.83 7.57 20.94 14.82 60.34 21.31 112.29 0.38 7.87 2.12 47.51 28.16 52.34 47.25 138.38 
Sum IN 45.33 23.97 59.93 105.34 84.42 252.48 36.93 608 12.13 48.95 14.81 223.94 173.31 210.71 107.85 792 
Net 46.99 83.92 60.3 -15.45 -15.3 -235.81 75.36 0 17.55 73.01 140.31 -110.03 -81.91 -69.44 30.53 0 
 
Notes to Table 5 
Variables in the first column are the impulse origin, while in the top row are the respondents to the shock. Values in the matrix represent the average cumulated spillover effect. The cumulative 
impact is bound between 0 and 1. A value of 0.5 means that the response variable will be impacted in the same direction with an intensity of 50% the initial unexpected shock in the impulse 
variable. In the last column we have the aggregated impact sent (Sum OUT) by each row variable and on the bottom row the aggregated spillover received (Sum IN) by each column variable. 
The bottom-right cell (in bold) shows total spillover in the system (by dividing this value to the total number of non-diagonal cells, i.e. 7x6, we obtain the contagion index of the Core and 
Peripheral group for the two different periods. The “Net” row represents the net spillover of each variable (Net Spillover=Sum OUT-Sum IN). 
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Table 6 
Panel-VAR and FEVDs with Latent Variable from Qual VAR  
 
 
Panel A (1 lag) 
Country group ESI 
Impulse variables 
IP HICP ystar Stock_Ret Unemploym Tradebal ESI 
Eurozone  5.20 0.60 6.67 21.23 0.47 0.02 65.78 
Core countries  3.63 0.96 12.8 25.27 0.45 0.08 56.83 
Peripheral countries  6.23 0.60 2.41 16.84 2.01 0.36 71.51 
Panel B (2 lags)  
Country group ESI 
Impulse variables 
IP HICP ystar Stock_Ret Unemploym Tradebal ESI 
Eurozone  5.21 0.37 8.34 19.5 0.26 0.16 66.12 
Core countries  3.90 1.09 12.6 21.43 2.28 0.26 58.43 
Peripheral countries  6.53 0.10 4.7 15.78 1.45 0.54 69.98 
Panel C (3 lags)  
Country group ESI 
Impulse variables 
IP HICP ystar Stock_Ret Unemploym Tradebal ESI 
Eurozone  2.55 0.68 8.78 19.94 1.00 0.78 66.18 
Core countries  2.36 2.05 10.60 22.7 2.40 1.29 58.63 
Peripheral countries  6.28 0.97 7.94 12.22 1.49 0.88 70.18 
Panel D - The US case  
US MCSI 
Impulse variables 
IP CPI ystar Stock_Ret Unemploym Tradebal MCSI 
US  14.46 7.79 6.80 7.32 1.68 2.83 59.84 
 
Notes to Table 7 
The Table presents results for Variance Decomposition Analysis, i.e. the contribution of ECB’s latent propensity 
to unconventional measures (ystar) to the variance in each column variable (IP, HICP, ystar, Stock_Ret, 
Unemploym, Tradebal and ESI) for each country group, namely the Eurozone countries including all countries, 
the Core countries (Germany, Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands) and the Peripheral countries (Spain, 
Italy, Portugal and Greece). The results are computed from a panel VAR with 1 lag (Panel A), 2 lags (Panel B) 
and 3 lags (Panel C). Note that we perform variance decomposition analysis for all variables shocks and impulse 
responses, however, we report here only the results for the decomposition of ESI and MCSI (the rest of the 
results are available upon request).   
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Table 7 
Contribution of the policy shock to variance of the common component 
 
 
FEVD 
10-month 
horizon 
FEVD 
20-month 
horizon 
𝑅2 
ESI GER 8.03 8.32 0.67 
ESI AUS 4.05 4.31 0.50 
ESI BE 4.44 4.71 0.57 
ESI FR 4.87 5.08 0.55 
ESI NL 4.27 4.41 0.64 
ESI SP 3.10 2.00 0.24 
ESI IT 1.40 1.52 0.35 
ESI PT 2.40 2.57 0.28 
ESI GR 3.30 3.40 0.30 
 
Notes to Table 7 
The column titled FEVD 10-month and FEVD 20-month horizon, 
reports the fraction of the variance of the forecast error, at the 
10-month and 20-month horizon, explained by the policy shock. 
𝑅2 refers to the fraction of the variance of the variable explained 
by the common factors, (𝐹𝑡 and 𝑅𝑡).  
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Figure 1 
Roots of Companion Matrix  
 
 
Notes to Figure 1 
The stability of the panel VAR requires the moduli of the eigenvalues of the dynamic matrix to lie 
within the unit circle. Panel VAR satisfies stability condition as all eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. 
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Figure 2 
IRFs: the effect of ECB’s conventional monetary policy on EU expectations 
 
The effect of a shock to ECB’s conventional monetary policy stance on ESI during 2007- 2012 
  
 
 
 
 
The effect of a shock to ECB’s conventional monetary policy stance on ESI during 2007- 2010 
  
 
 
 
 
The effect of a shock to ECB’s conventional monetary policy stance on ESI during 2010- 2012 
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Figure 3  
Country specific IRFs: the effect of ECB’s  
conventional monetary policy on EU expectations 
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Figure 4 
IRFs: the effect of Fed’s monetary policy stance on EU expectations 
 
 
The effect of a shock to Fed’s monetary policy stance on ESI during 2007- 2012 
  
 
 
 
 
The effect of a shock to Fed’s monetary policy stance on ESI during 2007- 2010 
  
 
 
 
 
The effect of a shock to Fed’s monetary policy stance on ESI during 2010- 2012 
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Figure 5 
ECB announcements (shaded) and latent propensity for ECB  
unconventional monetary measures (dash line) for Eurozone countries 
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Figure 6 
The effect of a shock of ECB’s unconventional policy stance on ESI 
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Figure 7 
 Fed’s  announcements (shaded) and  latent propensity for QE (dash line)  
 
The response of US economic expectations (MCSI) to a shock of Fed’s 
latent propensity to unconventional policy 
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Figure 8 
The effect of a shock to the latent propensity to ECB’s  
unconventional monetary policy stance on ESI- FAVAR model 
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